The Dalai Lama, who had by then become the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet, agreed to become the spiritual guide of the Manchu emperor.
He accepted patronage and protection in exchange. This "priest-patron" relationship, which the Dalai Lama also maintained with numerous Mongol Khans and Tibetan nobles, was the only formal tie that existed between the Tibetans and Manchus during the Qing dynasty. If did not, in itself, affect Tibet's independence. On the political level, some powerful Manchu emperors succeeded in exerting a degree of influence over Tibet. Thus, between and the Manchu emperors Kangxi, Yong Zhen and Qianlong sent imperial troops into Tibet four times to protect the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people from foreign invasion or internal unrest.
It was these expeditions that provided them with influence in Tibet. The emperor sent representatives to the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, some of whom successfully exercised their influence, in his name, over the Tibetan government, particularly with respect to the conduct of foreign relations. At the height of Manchu power, which lasted a few decades, the situation was not unlike that which can exist between a superpower and a neighboring satellite or protectorate.
The subjection of a state to foreign influence and even intervention in foreign or domestic affairs, however significant this may be politically, does not in itself entail the legal extinction of that state. Consequently, although some Manchu emperors exerted considerable influence over Tibet, they did not thereby incorporate Tibet into their empire, much less China. Manchu influence did not last for very long. It was entirely ineffective by the time the British briefly invaded Tibet in , and ceased entirely with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in , and its replacement in China by a native republican government.
Whatever ties existed between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor were extinguished with the dissolution of the Manchu Empire. From to , Tibet successfully avoided undue foreign influence and behaved, in every respect, as a fully independent state. The 13th Dalai Lama emphasized his country's independent status externally, in formal communications to foreign rulers, and internally, by issuing a proclamation reaffirming Tibet's independence and by strengthening the country's defenses.
The Tibetan government maintained independent international relations with all neighboring countries, most of whom had diplomatic representatives in Lhasa. The attitude of most foreign governments with whom Tibet maintained relations implied their recognition of Tibet's independent status.
The British government bound itself not to recognize Chinese suzerainty or any other rights over Tibet unless China signed the draft Simla Convention of with Britain and Tibet, which China never did.
Nepal's recognition was confirmed by the Nepalese government in , in documents presented to the United Nations in support of that government's application for membership. After defeating the small Tibetan army, the Chinese government imposed the so-called "Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" on the Tibetan government in May Because it was signed under duress, the agreement was void under international law.
And this funding is sorely needed: the adult illiteracy rate in Tibet is still 52 percent. Only 78 percent of the children start elementary school, and of those only 35 percent enter middle school. But Chinese assistance must be considered in the context of what's being taught in the schools—a critical issue for Tibetans. One morning I visited an elementary school on a spacious, beautiful campus, with new buildings and a grass playground that stretched westward under the shadow of a 14,foot mountain.
Most of the school's students were Tibetan. I paused at the central information board, where announcements were written in Chinese. Next to this was a notice telling students to "remember the great goals. Beside these goals was a long political section that read, in part,. It was heavy stuff for elementary school students and indeed, if I were a Chinese propagandist, I would think twice before exhorting Tibetan children to resist imperialism , and it indicates how politicized the climate of a Chinese school is.
Despite all the recent economic changes in China, the education system is still tied to the past. This conservatism imbues every aspect of education, starting with language. Two of the schools I visited were mixed Han and Tibetan, and classes were segregated by ethnicity. The reasons here are linguistic: most Tibetan children don't start learning Mandarin until elementary school, and even many Tibetan high school students, as the Han teachers complained, don't understand Chinese well.
This segregation leads to different curricula—for example, Tibetan students have daily Tibetan-language classes, whereas Han students use that time for extra English instruction. To the Chinese, this system seems fair, especially since Tibetan students have the right to join the Han classes.
But Tibetans feel that there is an overemphasis on Chinese, especially at the higher levels, which threatens their language and culture. All the classes taught by Han teachers are in Chinese or English, and most of the Tibetan teachers in the middle and high schools are supposed to use Mandarin although the ones I spoke with said they often used Tibetan, because otherwise their students wouldn't understand.
In any case, important qualifying exams emphasize Chinese, and this reflects a society in which fluency is critical to success, especially when it comes to any sort of government job. Another, more basic issue is that Tibetan students are overwhelmed. One Han teacher told me that his students came primarily from nomad areas, where their families lived in tents; yet during the course of an average day they might have classes in Tibetan, Chinese, and English, three languages with almost nothing in common.
Political and religious issues are paramount. In Lhasa I met a twenty-one-year-old Tibet University student who was angered by his school's anti-religious stance, which is standard for schools in Tibet. But of course most of the students still believe in religion—I'd say that eighty to ninety percent of us are devout.
Such complaints reflect the results of recent education reforms. A series of them made in , characteristically, represent both the good and the bad aspects of Chinese support. On the one hand, the government stepped up its campaign against illiteracy, and on the other, it resolved to control the political content of education more carefully, in hopes of pacifying the region.
There has certainly been some success with this approach: I met a number of educated Tibetans who identified closely with China. Tashi, Mei Zhiyuan's roommate, seemed completely comfortable being both Tibetan and Chinese: he had studied in Sichuan, he had a good job, and he had the government's support to thank.
When I asked him what was the biggest problem in Tibet, he mentioned language—but not in the way many Tibetans did. They need to study harder. Most Tibetans seemed less likely to accept Chinese support at face value. But it was clear that politically they were being pulled in a number of directions at once, and my conversations with educated young Tibetans were dizzying experiences.
Their questions ranged from odd "Which do you think is going to win, capitalism or socialism? One Monday morning I watched the flag-raising ceremony at a middle school, where students and staff members lined up to listen to the national anthem, after which, in unison, they pledged allegiance to the Communist Party, love for the motherland, and dedication to studying and working hard.
With the Tibetan mountains towering above, it was a surreal scene—and it became all the more so when the school's political adviser, a Tibetan in his early thirties with silver teeth, walked over and asked me where I was from. After I told him, he said, "Here in Tibet we already have a lot of influence from your Western countries—like Pepsi, Coke, movies, things like that.
My opinion is that there are good and bad things coming from the West. For example, things regarding sex. In America, if you're married and you decide that you want another lover, what do you do? You get a divorce, regardless of how it affects your wife and child. But the people here are very religious, and we don't like those kinds of ideas.
I heard a number of comments like this, and undoubtedly the education system included a great deal of anti-America propaganda. I felt that here the Chinese were almost doing the Tibetans a service; nothing depressed me more than my conversations with less-educated Tibetans, who invariably had great faith in American support and believed that President Clinton, who was then in China on last year's state visit, had come in order to save Tibet.
Considering that China's interest in Tibet is largely a reaction to foreign imperialism, it's no surprise that nothing makes the Chinese angrier and more stubborn than the sight of the Dalai Lama and other exiled leaders seeking—and winning—support in America and elsewhere. And yet Tibetan faith in America seems naive given America's treatment of its own indigenous people, and because historically U. For example, the CIA trained and armed Tibetan guerrillas in the s, during a critical period of mostly peaceful if tenuous cooperation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese.
The peace ended when Tibetan uprisings, in which these guerrillas played a part, resulted in brutal Chinese repression and the Dalai Lama's flight to India. America also represents modernity, and a further complication, beyond the Chinese political agenda, is that the long-isolated Tibetan society must come to grips with the modern world. One college student said, "The more money we Tibetans have, the higher our living standard is, the more we forget our own culture.
And with or without the Chinese, I think that would be happening. Perhaps the most hopeful moment in recent Han-Tibetan relations came shortly after , when the Chinese Party Secretary, Hu Yaobang, went on a fact-finding mission to Tibet and returned with severe criticisms of Chinese policies. He advocated a two-pronged solution: Chinese investment was needed to spur economic growth in Tibet, but at the same time the Han should be more respectful of Tibetan culture. Cadres needed to learn Tibetan; the language should be used in government offices serving the public; and religion should be allowed more freedom.
There's no question that such respect is sorely needed, especially with regard to language. I never met a single government-sent Han worker who was learning Tibetan—not even the volunteers who would be there for eight years. And in Lhasa at the Xinhua bookstore, the largest in the city, I found not one textbook for Chinese students of Tibetan—books for foreign students, yes, but nothing for the Chinese.
Some of the reforms were implemented, but they were cut short by a series of riots in Lhasa that started in To Beijing hardliners, the riots indicated that too much freedom is a bad thing, and in Hu Yaobang was purged, partly for his recommendations regarding Tibet. By the spring of martial law had been declared in Tibet, and the Chinese concluded that relaxing restrictions on Tibetan culture and religion was tantamount to encouraging unrest.
The two-pronged solution was quickly cut in half: Beijing would simply develop the economy, hoping that rising standards of living would defuse political tensions while building closer economic ties with the interior. This policy has been accelerated by the enormous investments of the s. Development, however, often comes at the cost of culture.
Traditional sections of Lhasa are being razed in favor of faceless modern buildings, and the economic boom is attracting hordes of Han and Hui an Islamic minority migrants to Tibet. Outsiders dominate Tibet's economy—indeed, they've essentially built it, inspiring enormous resentment among the Tibetan population. I met some Tibetans who didn't mind that cadres were sent from the interior, but I never met one who wasn't opposed to the influx of migrant workers, especially the huge numbers of Han from nearby Sichuan.
Longtime Han residents, too, felt this was a serious problem. The phenomenon of liudong renkou, or "floating population," is affecting urban areas all across China, with some million people seeking work away from home.
In the west and south there are particularly large numbers of Sichuanese in the floating population, and during my travels I often heard the same prejudices: the Sichuanese migrants are uncultured, their women loose, their men jiaohua, sly. And worst of all, people complained, they keep coming. Having spent two years in Sichuan, I understand why the Sichuanese so often leave. Their province, roughly the size of France, contains million people, and the economy is so shaky that recent factory closings have led to worker uprisings in some cities.
Mostly the Sichuanese leave because they aren't afraid to; they have been toughened by tough conditions, and all across China that is another thing they are famous for: their ability to chiku—eat bitter. They work and they survive, and like successful migrants anywhere else in the world, they are resented for their success. In Tibet the Sichuanese have helped themselves to a large chunk of the economy. This was clear from the moment I arrived at the Lhasa airport, where thirteen of the sixteen restaurants bordering the entrance advertised Sichuan food.
It did not, in itself, affect Tibet's independence. On the political level, some powerful Manchu emperors succeeded in exerting a degree of influence over Tibet. Thus, between and , Emperors Kangxi, Yong Zhen, and Qianlong sent imperial troops to Tibet four times to protect the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people from foreign invasions by Mongols, and Gorkhas or from internal unrest.
These expeditions provided the emperor with the means for establishing influence in Tibet. He sent representatives to the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, some of whom successfully exercised their influence, in his name, over the Tibetan government, particularly with respect to the conduct of foreign relations. At the height of Manchu power, which lasted a few decades, the situation was not unlike that which can exist between a superpower and a satellite or protectorate, and therefore one which, though politically significant, does not extinguish the independent existence of the weaker state.
Tibet was never incorporated into the Manchu Empire, much less China, and it continued to conduct its relations with neighboring states largely on its own. Manchu influence did not last very long. It was entirely ineffective by the time the British briefly invaded Lhasa and concluded a bilateral treaty with Tibet, the Lhasa Convention, in Despite this loss of influence, the imperial government in Peking continued to claim some authority over Tibet, particularly with respect to its international relations, an authority which the British imperial government termed "suzerainty" in its dealings with Peking and St.
Petersburg, Russia. Chinese imperial armies tried to reassert actual influence in by invading the country and occupying Lhasa. Following the revolution in China and the overthrow of the Manchu Empire, the troops surrendered to the Tibetan army and were repatriated under a sino-Tibetan peace accord.
The Dalai Lama reasserted Tibet's full independence internally, by issuing a proclamation, and externally, in communications to foreign rulers and in a treaty with Mongolia. Tibet in the 20th Century Tibet's status following the expulsion of Manchu troops is not subject to serious dispute.
What ever ties existed between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu emperors of the Qing Dynasty were extinguished with the fall of that empire and dynasty. From to , Tibet successfully avoided undue foreign influence and behaved, in every respect, as a fully independent state.
Tibet maintained diplomatic relations with nepal, Bhutan, Britain, and later with independent India. Relations with China remain strained. The Chinese waged a border war with Tibet while formally urging Tibet to "join" the Chinese Republic, claiming all along to the world that Tibet already was one of China's "five races.
As the British delegation reminded his Chinese counterpart, Tibet entered the conference as "independent nation recognizing no allegiance to China. It was, nevertheless, significant in that Anglo-Tibetans friendship was reaffirmed with the conclusion of bilateral trade and border agreements.
In a Joint Declaration, Great Britain and Tibet bound themselves not to recognize Chinese suzerainty or other special rights in Tibet unless China signed the draft Simla Convention which would have guaranteed Tibet's greater borders, its territorial integrity and fully autonomy.
Some 3, Tibetans fled as refugees to India in Some , Tibetans were refugees in neighboring countries in December , including , refugees in India and 18, refugees in Nepal. Tibetans rioted against Chinese government rule in Lhasa and other Chinese provinces on March , , resulting in the deaths of at least 19 individuals. Representatives of the Dalai Lama held talks in Beijing in July On October 27, , the PRC government confirmed that two Tibetans were executed for their involvement in the March riots in Lhasa.
PRC government police raided a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Sichuan Province on April 21, , resulting in the deaths of two individuals. Lobsang Sangay was declared the winner of the election for prime minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile with 55 percent of the vote on April 26, , and he was officially sworn in as prime minister in Dharamsala, India on August 7, Some 49, Tibetan exiles throughout the world cast ballots in the election.
Jigme Gyatso, a Tibetan political prisoner since , was released from prison by the PRC government on March 30, Grunfeld, A. The Making of Modern Tibet, revised edition.
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